Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me commend you once again. This has been a wonderful testimony

this morning and very, very helpful. Dr. Kanter, yours is

not prepared testimony I gather, or at least we did not get copies

of your testimony.

Well, we will get it from the transcript here. It

was very, very worthwhile. And I thank all three of you.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this. It was most timely and

appropriate.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask unanimous consent—there is a yet

unpublished article that is going to appear shortly by Kevin Kim.

He was a Fulbright scholar in South Korea between 2001 and 2002

and has written a very, very good article which is going to appear

shortly—I am trying to—where is that going to appear?

The Institute of Public Affairs is about to publish

this. It is not published yet, but, Mr. Chairman, I think you might

find it worthwhile, to sort of complement, in a little more blunt

terms in some ways, but complement what has been said here this morning.

And I have, as much as I am obviously—trying to figure out

what motivates the North Koreans is something we could spend

days trying to sort out here. But let me ask you to focus your attention,

because I am trying to sort out what the motivations are here

in terms of our own administration’s view of this. And obviously

there have been varying reports.

But let me ask you to comment on something, and I am a bit concerned

that there seems to be almost, by some anyway, a desire to

delay taking any action on the North Korean issue until there is

some ‘‘resolution of the Iraqi issue.’’ And the argument being and

I will make the argument—I am not suggesting that anyone has

made this argument—that in a sense, if Iraq turns out well as a

result of the use of military force, and I am not being terribly articulate

in describing this, but if that turns out well, then that may

be the model of how we would then deal with North Korea.

Without suggesting that that is the motivation, I am curious as

to whether or not any of you believe that waiting for the resolution

of Iraq is part of the motivations of why we are not seeing more

clarity out of the administration in terms of how they want to proceed

with North Korea.

And second, where is this heading right now in the absence of

doing anything else? I gather we are now going to fly F–15s along

with these reconnaissance missions and the like. There have been

examples, at least people who have followed the events in the Korean

Peninsula more closely than I have, who indicate that in the

past when these events have occurred in the late ’70s, they were

not just single events; there were usually a series of them that happened.

And I am wondering whether or not you believe that we

may be seeing that here.

And if our only response seems to be providing additional protection,

military protection, reconnaissance flights and sort of appearing

to have sort of a quasi-military answer to these events as they

are occurring, to what extent would you want to calibrate the risks

of seeing this series of events explode into something far more serious

than what we presently have seen?

But I would be interested in having you try and give me some

sense of what is the thinking going on by those who are advising

the administration inside about how to proceed here? What is the

rationale behind this, other than just—there is more than just an

internal debate that seems to be going on. There seems to be a rationale

for proceeding this way without having some clarity to it,

and I am curious if any of you would be willing to take that one.

Let me throw in one additional question to you

here. If you go back and look at the events since the Framework

Agreement, there were obviously events that were—decisions were

delayed, between the time we promise things and things happen.

Obviously, North Korea made a number of bad decisions as well

here.

To what extent, I will ask—I should add this on here: To what

extent would it help move this along—and I know administrations

are loathe to do this, to admit that we might have done things a

bit differently here. But to some extent the admission that maybe

we missed some opportunities here, would that help at all in trying

to move this process along here?

And I again, understanding the unwillingness of people to want

to do this, but would that help, in your mind, if there was some

message here that maybe some missed opportunities occurred on

the light water reactor issue, on the economic assistance issues?

There were periods in which those events were to occur and obviously

some months or, in some cases, years transpired between the

promise and the actual delivery.

I agree.

Right.

Yes.

And how about motivations? What is—why, beyond

some of the—you know, the argument of the public statements

being made. What is going on here, in your view?

And I realize none of you are part of the administration. You are

not privy necessarily to that, but I want your speculation as to why

there seems to be such a delay and with some clarity on a strategy

here dealing with North Korea? What is going on here? Bob.

Ash, did you want to comment on that at all?

Yes.

Right.

Right.

Last—and I do not want to put words in all your

mouths—but I heard all three of you and you said this different

ways. It seemed to me your unanimous conclusion that every day

delayed on engaging in this conversation, call it whatever words

you want to, is extremely dangerous.

But the conclusion that every day delayed heightens

the degree of dangerousness with regard to North Korea and

that is—all three of you have drawn that conclusion; is that true?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.